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Introduction
High response rates and low panel attrition are key for studies such
as TREE (Transitions from Education to Employment).
A subpopulation of special interest in TREE are adolescents from
disadvantaged backgrounds, as these adolescents have elevated risks
of remaining without upper secondary education.
The very same group, however, is difficult to study because of high
nonresponse and panel attrition.
In the pretest sample of the second TREE cohort we therefore
implemented a survey experiment to evaluate the effect of (small)
monetary incentives.
We expected that such incentives may work particularly well for the
critical subpopulation of disadvantaged adolescents.
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Hypotheses
Various studies show that (unconditional) monetary incentives do
have an effect on response rates. Less clear, however, are the exact
mechanisms behind these effects and the conditions under which
incentive work well or not.
One theoretical angle to look at survey participation is to
conceptualize participation as a rational decision. In this case,
respondents balance costs of participation (time and effort) with
benefits that may have individual or social and intrinsic or extrinsic
components.
intrinsic extrinsic
individual enjoyment, curiosity, interest in
content of survey
symbolic appreciation,
material/monetary gratification
social contribution to public good,
increase scientific knowledge,
etc.
benefits for in-group
Monetary incentives work by increasing the individual-extrinsic utility
component.
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Hypotheses
An alternative approach sees survey participation as a specific form
of social exchange and highlights the importance of reciprocity.
According to this view also symbolic gifts without a high material
value can be effective. Furthermore, monetary incentives can be
counterproductive because they change the nature of the exchange
and crowd out intrinsic motivation.
In any case, it is reasonable to assume that the motivation to
participate in a survey may differ between subpopulations and that
monetary incentives will have differential effects.
For example, we expect intrinsic motivation to be low among
adolescents from disadvantaged backgrounds. At the same time, due
to their low economic resources, monetary incentives should work
better in this subpopulation.
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Hypotheses
H1: Incentive effects will be generally low in our study because we
use a sample of respondents with relatively high intrinsic motivation.
H2: A gift certificate will have a stronger effect in our study than
plain money because it has more of a symbolic character and is less
likely to crowd out intrinsic motivation.
H3: Monetary incentives will be effective primarily for adolescents
from disadvantaged backgrounds. This is relevant because response
rates are particularly low for these adolescents.
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Sample and experimental groups
Our study focuses on a pretest sample of 541 adolescents who
participated in 2015 in a (class-room) pretest for a Swiss large scale
assessment study and who provided valid contact details so that
they can be contacted one year later.
Providing these contact details was voluntary, so our sample is a
positive selection of adolescents with high intrinsic motivation.
The respondents were randomly divided into three (evenly sized)
experimental groups:
I No incentive (control group)
I Unconditional incentive: rail check (10 CHF)
I Unconditional incentive: cash (10 CHF)
Respondents then contacted for a first follow-up interview in 2016.
They were interviewed by CATI or, as a secondary mode, by
paper-and-pencil questionnaire.
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Outcomes
We look at effects on various outcomes.
I response rate
F proportion of respondents who participated in the interviews (CATI or
mail questionnaire)
I CATI proportion
F proportion of telephone interviews among all interviews
I panel drop-out rate
F proportion of respondents who actively refused participation in future
waves or did not agree to data linkage across waves
I etc.
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Types of results
As indicated, our sample is selective. We therefore report raw results
as well as results for which the sample composition has been
adjusted using reweighting.
Raw (unweighted) pretest sample results
I Descriptive incentive effects in the pretest sample at hand.
Population reweighted results
I Estimates of the incentive effects for the relevant population of
school leavers. The weights compensate selectivity due to sample
design (overrepresentation of small cantons) as well as differential
cooperation (providing contact details).
Main sample reweighted results
I Estimates of the incentive effects to be expected in the main sample
of the TREE study. The composition of the pretest sample and the
main sample is quite different because the cooperation rate
(respondents providing contact details) could be substantially
increased in the main study. Weights are computed using entropy
balancing (Hainmueller 2012).
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Incentive effects on response rate
None
Railcheck
Cash
Railcheck
or cash
Cash vs.
Railcheck
.7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1 -.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Pretest sample
Population estimate
Main study sample
Levels Differences
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Incentive effects on CATI proportion
None
Railcheck
Cash
Railcheck
or cash
Cash vs.
Railcheck
.65 .7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1 -.25 -.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Pretest sample
Population estimate
Main study sample
Levels Differences
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Incentive effects on panel drop-out
None
Railcheck
Cash
Railcheck
or cash
Cash vs.
Railcheck
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Levels Differences
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Incentive effects by cooperation probability
With respect to H3 we are interested in how incentive effects depend
on characteristics of respondents.
Adolescents from disadvantaged backgrounds are underrepresented
in our sample, but for many research questions they are very relevant
and it would be good to have good coverage of this group.
In general, there are characteristics that are related to low survey
participation and we are interested in whether incentives can be used
to counterbalance such selectivity.
We use heterogeneous treatment effect analysis as suggested by Xie
et al. (2012) to evaluate whether incentive effects are related to the
propensity score of cooperation.
The propensity score of cooperation is the estimated probability of
providing contact details (see above). Important predictors are, for
example, gender, migration background, parental education, and
satisfaction with school.
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Incentive effects on response rate
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Incentive effects on CATI proportion
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Incentive effects on panel drop-out
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Conclusions
Compared to the literature, incentive effects indeed seem to be
relatively low in our sample (H1; effect of about 5 percentage points
on the participation rate).
However, we could not confirm our expectation, that gift certificates
have a stronger effect than plain cash (H2).
With respect to H3 we find clear evidence for heterogeneous effects.
Incentive effects are stronger for adolescents with low cooperation
probabilities; for adolescents with high cooperation the effects
vanish.
I From a practical perspective this raises the question whether targeted
incentives should be used. Such targeted incentives seem to be
effective and cost efficient, but there might also be good arguments
against their usage.
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